

**Endnotes for Belinda Wu, 'Pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong: Civil disobedience and a Christian response to unwarranted state violence'**

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**Endnotes**

1. William Stringfellow, *Conscience and Obedience: The Politics of Romans 13 and Revelation 13 in Light of the Second Coming* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2004), 9.

2. In the last two decades, Beijing has continued to censor freedom of the press through economic sanctions. On various occasions, Beijing has pushed for changes in the curriculum in Hong Kong schools that, among other things, tried to erase significant events in China such as the disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign and the Tiananmen Square massacre. They also proposed electoral reforms to influence who was eligible for election, which sparked the Umbrella Movement in 2014. See 'The Prophetic Voice of Hong Kong's Protesters', *Christianity Today*, 30<sup>th</sup> September 2019, christianitytoday.com.

3. Samson Yuen, Francis L. F. Lee, Gary Tang and Edmund W. Cheng, 'Hong Kong's Summer of Uprising: From Anti-Extradition to Anti-Authoritarian Protests', *The China Review* 19, no. 4 (November 2019): 2.

4. The OCLP evolved into a 79-day occupation of the Central District by democratic movement leaders and tens of thousands of students, with tents set up, joined by numerous citizens including many Christians and young professionals expressing their solidarity with the students. See Nancy Ng and Andreas Fulda, 'The Religious Dimension of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement', *Journal of Church and State* 60, no. 3 (2018): 378.

From the early days of the OCLP campaign, a large number of people from different sectors of society – mostly democratic parties, students, teachers, professionals, media and white collar workers – participated in peaceful sit-in assemblies and marches. In response, police used tear gas and pepper spray to crack down on the protestors, who put on face masks and used umbrellas to protect themselves, which gave the movement the nickname the 'Umbrella Movement'. See Ng and Fulda, 'The Religious Dimension', 377-379.

Police also beat protestors with batons. In one case, 7 police officers were caught on video by a television crew taking a protestor to a dark corner and beating him with his hands tied behind his back. Five of these police were subsequently prosecuted successfully in 2017. See Alan Wong, '7 Hong Kong Police Officers Convicted of Assaulting Protester in 2014', *The New York Times*, 14<sup>th</sup> February 2017, nytimes.com.

5. Ng and Fulda, 'The Religious Dimension', 378.

6. For decades, 'the government's pro-business policies had exposed the defects of a neoliberal capitalist economy, antagonizing both the middle class and the poor people'. Christie Chui-Shan Chow and Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, 'Almost Democratic: Christian Activism and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong', *Exchange* 45, no. 3 (2016): 256.

7. Since 1997 the policies are seen as benefiting the rich, investors from China and those close to the CCP. Over the years, more than a few major infrastructure projects

were approved to be carried out by China-controlled companies, resulting in an astronomical budget deficit, which is seen by Hong Kong people as corruption.

8. Chow and Lee, 'Almost Democratic', 256.

9. Man Yee Karen Lee, 'Lawyers and Hong Kong's Democracy Movement: From Electoral Politics to Civil Disobedience', *Asian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1 (2017): 98.

10. The initiators of the OLCP were:

Pastor Yiu-ming Chu, who has campaigned on behalf of the poor and was involved in rescuing mainland activists following the Tiananmen Square massacre on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1989. See Chow and Lee, 'Almost Democratic', 261.

Benny Yiu-ting Tai, a Christian law professor and Associate Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong. See Zuwei Lin, 'Hong Kong's "Occupy Central Three Sons" Accounted for the Exclusive Confession before Being Found Guilty: The Reflection of the Umbrella Movement, the Price of Citizens' Disobedience', *BBC News Chinese*, 9<sup>th</sup> April 2019, [bbc.com](http://bbc.com).

Chan Kin-Man, a sociology professor who embraces Christian values. See Fuk-tsang Ying, 'My Life Has Changed from Water to Wine: Chan Kin-Man's Faith and Practice - Interview with Chan, Kin-Man 「我的生命已由水變酒」陳健民的信仰與實踐', *Christian Times*, 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2019, [christiantimes.org.hk](http://christiantimes.org.hk).

11. Ng and Fulda, 'The Religious Dimension', 380.

12. Towards the end of the occupation, accompanied by groups of Protestant and Catholic Christians singing hymns and holding a banner with Matthew 5:10 'Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness', the three leaders and 69 collaborating leaders and participants surrendered to a police station for the offence of illegal assembly, claiming fidelity to law as their responsibility under civil disobedience. See 陸凱文, '[佔中三子]自首參與非法集會65人響應未遭扣留', *Gospel Herald*, 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2014, [chinese.gospelherald.com](http://chinese.gospelherald.com).

In his closing statement in court before he was convicted and penalised with a 16-month jail term, Benny Yiu-ting Tai portrayed himself as a suffering disciple of Jesus: 'If we are really guilty, then our offense is our fearlessness to spread hope in this hostile moment in Hong Kong. I am not afraid or ashamed to go to prison. If this bitter cup cannot be removed, I will drink without regret'. '若我們真是有罪，那麼我們的罪名就是在香港這艱難的時刻仍敢於去散播希望。入獄我不懼怕，也不羞愧。若這苦杯都不能挪開，我會無悔地飲下。' See Lin, 'Hong Kong's "Occupy Central Three Sons". (These 3 proponents of the movement and 6 others, collectively called 'Nine Protagonists for Occupy Central', were charged with 'conspiracy to commit public nuisance', 'incite others to commit public nuisance' and 'incite others to incite public nuisance', for which they were sentenced with jail terms, except for a few who avoided jail terms for reasons of age or health).

13. Many pastors and church leaders made their churches available as shelter for the protestors and offered prayer support. See Ng and Fulda, 'The Religious Dimension of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement', 379-380. Also, at the protest site, there was a 'Pastoral Spiritual Support Station', where spiritual counselling and support were made available for protestors who struggled with theological, ethical and political issues. See Chow and Lee, 'Almost Democratic', 262.

14. Chi-fung Wong was the founder of a student activist group, Scholarism, and was 17 years old at the time of OCLP. He was brought up by his parents with a strong Lutheran teaching of love and care for neighbours. See Ng and Fulda, 'The Religious

Dimension of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement', 393. Wong, together with two other student leaders and the entire Umbrella Movement, was nominated by a bipartisan group of US lawmakers for the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize for 'their peaceful efforts to bring political reform and protect the autonomy and freedoms in Hong Kong'. They were sentenced to prison terms of a few months for their unlawful assemblies during the movement in 2014. See 'Joshua Wong', *Wikipedia*, n.d., en.wikipedia.org.

15. Lee, 'Lawyers and Hong Kong's Democracy Movement', 102.

16. The bill was widely criticised by many sectors of society including business, legal, media, education and Christian and human rights groups, who were concerned that it would undermine human rights, expose people to abuse and intimidation, and silence dissidents. In late May 2019 the Legislative Council, which was dominated by pro-Beijing law makers, passed a motion to schedule the second reading of the Bill to be passed on 12<sup>th</sup> June, bypassing the usual practice of having the Bill scrutinised by the Bills Committee. See '2019 Hong Kong Extradition Bill', *Wikipedia*, n.d., en.wikipedia.org.

17. Learning from the experience of the 2014 Umbrella Movement, the frontline protestors used umbrellas and sophisticated face masks to defend themselves from tear gas, pepper spray and police batons, and to hide their faces to prevent subsequent prosecution by the CCP, which is well known for its sophisticated facial recognition system.

18. When police fired tear gas and pepper spray on the crowds, a small group of young frontline protestors threw water bottles, bricks and umbrellas at police officers, attempting to break the police cordon to deter the police so that peaceful protestors could leave. This was reported by many major news media, both local and international. See Haley Willis, Barbara Marcolini, Javier C. Hernández, Tiffany May, Elsie Chen, Drew Jordan and Shane O'Neill, 'Did Hong Kong Police Use Violence against Protesters? What the Videos Show', *The New York Times*, 14<sup>th</sup> July 2019, nytimes.com. The use of excessive force by police was captured on video and posted online by several citizens and reporters.

19. Amnesty International published a report concluding 'that the use of force by Hong Kong police against the largely peaceful protest was unnecessary and excessive and that police had violated international human rights law and standards'. The report stated that video clips showed large crowds of unarmed protestors being cornered by riot police, who fired nine rounds of tear gas and used pepper spray from behind the protestors who had nowhere to go to avoid the tear gas. This caused chaos and injury among the crowd. Amnesty International has examined a non-exhaustive collection of footages. They have verified 20 of them and confirmed 14 incidents of excessive use of force by police during the peaceful mass protest on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2019. See 'How Not to Police a Protest: Unlawful Use of Force by Hong Kong Police', *Amnesty International*, no. ASA 17/0576/2019 (21<sup>st</sup> June 2019), 4, amnesty.org.

20. The Hospital Authority reported 81 casualties on that day and police reported that 22 officers sustained injuries. See 'How Not to Police a Protest', 17.

21. Kris Cheng, '"Very Restrained" – Hong Kong Police Say 150 Rounds of Tears Gas, 20 Bean Bag Shots Fired During Anti-Extradition Law "Riot"', *Hong Kong Free Press*, 13<sup>th</sup> June 2019, hongkongfp.com. 'In comparison, 87 rounds of tear gas canisters were used during the 2014 Umbrella Movement protests.'

22. Approximately two million people took to the streets on 16<sup>th</sup> June in defiance of the government and called for the complete withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, an independent investigation into the use of excessive force by police and the resignation

of the Chief Executive. See 'Hong Kong: Timeline of Extradition Protests', *BBC News*, 4<sup>th</sup> September 2019, [bbc.com/news/world-asia-china](http://bbc.com/news/world-asia-china).

Later, on 1<sup>st</sup> July, the anniversary of Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty, half a million people marched peacefully to the Central District chanting 'Five demands, not one less', which include demands for the retraction of the characterisation of the protests as 'riots', the release and exoneration of arrested protesters, and universal suffrage for the election of lawmakers and the Chief Executive. See '2019–20 Hong Kong Protests', *Wikipedia*, n.d., [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

Frustrated by the Chief Executive's non-response to repeated requests for open conversation, by police excess violence and by their characterisation of the 12<sup>th</sup> June peaceful protest as a riot, and enraged by several suicides related to the movement, several hundred protestors, primarily students, gathered around the Legislative Council building at night, attempting to break through the main front glass door to go inside. See K.K. Rebecca Lai, Alan Yuhas and Jin Wu, 'Six Months of Hong Kong Protests. How Did We Get Here?', *The New York Times*, 18<sup>th</sup> November 2019, [nytimes.com](http://nytimes.com).

Despite efforts by a democratic political party leader to calm the protestors, a few radical protestors eventually smashed the glass front door after the police inside deliberately evacuated the building through the back door, leaving an empty building for the protestors. Several hundred desperate young protestors poured into the building to declare their fight for democracy and vandalised the meeting hall, glass doors, offices, lobby, furniture, equipment and walls, while several journalists reported the situation on live TV for several hours. See Lai and Wu, 'Six Months of Hong Kong Protests'.

Most of the protestors escaped before police announced their arrival at midnight. In a broadcast at 4am on live TV, the Police Chief announced that full force would be used to arrest the 'rioters'.

23. On 21<sup>st</sup> July, a pro-government mob in white t-shirts, holding Chinese national flags, indiscriminately attacked passengers and residents in the Yuen Long train station and the surrounding area. Some of the mob were later identified as members of organised crime groups. The attack was broadcast live on online media, resulting in as many as 20,000 emergency calls to police rescue. Many local residents ran to the nearby police station to ask for help, only to find the police station door closed and no police coming out to help, leaving many injured in the train station and women crying in horror. Despite numerous emergency calls for help and CCTV in the station linked to a police headquarters in the region, police were slow to arrive (almost 40 minutes later) at the scene and did not make any arrests of the attackers that night. These facts, coupled with video clips reported by media showing some police having friendly chats with a group of men in white t-shirts in the area on the day, have fuelled speculation that police had collaborated with the criminal gangs that carried out the mob attack. See Lai and Wu, 'Six Months of Hong Kong Protests'. Also see the investigative report '鏗鏘集 : 7.21誰主真相 Sonorous Collection: 7.21. Who Holds the Truth' (Hong Kong: Radio Television Hong Kong, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2020), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6psWa6uVoVY>.

In other incidents, confrontations between the two camps were a frequent occurrence along the Lennon Walls, with pro-Beijing or pro-police groups attempting to tear down the banners and remove poster art. See Alvin Lum and Clifford Lo, 'Two Retired Policemen among Three People Arrested over Clashes Sparked by "Lennon Walls". Hong Kong's Latest Show of Defiance against Hated Extradition Bill', *South China Morning Post*, 11<sup>th</sup> July 2019, [scmp.com](http://scmp.com).

It was also reported that a pro-Beijing group, waving the Chinese national flag, assaulted pro-democracy protesters. See 'Hong Kong Protesters Clash with Pro-Beijing Counterparts', *Al-Jazeera*, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2019, [aljazeera.com](http://aljazeera.com).

24. On 11<sup>th</sup> August, police fired tear gas toward protesters inside a metro station with lots of innocent bystanders inside the station, violating safety guidelines. See Lai and Wu, 'Six Months of Hong Kong Protests'.

Later, on the same day, as many as 1.7 million protestors marched peacefully to the city centre in heavy rain to protest against police brutality, but continued to be ignored by the government. See Lai and Wu, 'Six Months of Hong Kong Protests'.

In another major incident on 31<sup>st</sup> August, police chased suspected protestors down to the train station, stormed the station and brutally beat suspected protestors and other 'suspects' inside the station and carriage. Innocent bystanders were injured. See Man-Kei Tam, 'Hong Kong: Rampaging Police Must Be Investigated', *Amnesty International*, 1<sup>st</sup> September 2019, [amnesty.org](http://amnesty.org). Train services were suspended and the station was locked down, with access denied to voluntary medics and journalists. Full CCTV footage of what happened inside the station was not released to the public despite legal proceedings, fuelling speculation that some protestors were beaten to death. See Vincent Wong, 'The "831" Prince Edward Mtr Incident Proves Hong Kong Urgently Needs Access to Information Reform', *Hong Kong Free Press*, 22<sup>nd</sup> September 2019, [hongkongfp.com](http://hongkongfp.com).

25. (1) During the crackdown, riot police with no police identification numbers, wearing full protective gear and masks, used excessive force against protestors. Protestors who were beaten and abused by them have been deprived of formal channels of complaint.

(2) Police are reported to have engaged in arbitrary arrests and the torture of detained protestors. An independent field investigation of police brutality towards protestors by Amnesty International from June to September revealed a disturbing pattern of police misconduct including arbitrary arrests, brutal beatings and kicking of captured protestors, who offered no resistance. There were also many instances of delaying protestors' access to medical care and legal counsel, as well as torture while in police detention. See Nicholas Bequelin, 'Hong Kong: Arbitrary Arrests, Brutal Beatings and Torture in Police Detention Revealed', *Amnesty International*, 19<sup>th</sup> September 2019, [amnesty.org](http://amnesty.org).

(3) It was observed that police stopped, searched and arrested young people and students indiscriminately, and citizens denounced police for seeing 'being young as a crime'. See Ryan Ho Kilpatrick and Alice Su, 'Being Young Is a Crime', in 'Hong Kong: Police Arrest Students and Teenagers', *Los Angeles Times*, 27<sup>th</sup> September 2019, [latimes.com](http://latimes.com).

(4) The authority of the city's primary public transport system collaborated with the government to suspend services of various major metro train lines regularly on weekends and after working hours, causing chaos and making it extremely difficult for citizens to get around. As a result, some citizens blamed protestors for vandalising station entry gates and ticketing machines, leading to chaos.

26. (1) Both camps stepped up efforts on social media to spread unproven rumours and misinformation as a way of trying to win public opinion. See Shelly Banjo and Natalie Lung, 'How Fake News and Rumors Are Stoking Division in Hong Kong', *Bloomberg*, 12<sup>th</sup> November 2019, [bloomberg.com](http://bloomberg.com).

(2) Polarised digital social media included half-truths, carefully-edited videos and selective reporting from both camps, each pushing their side of the narrative. See

Esther Chan and Rachel Blundy, 'Fake News Amplifies Fear and Confusion in Hong Kong', *Hong Kong Free Press*, 21<sup>st</sup> November 2019, hongkongfp.com.

(3) Chinese state media and the '50 Cent Army' online trolls 'running what Facebook and Twitter have called "organised disinformation campaigns" have used edited footage and carefully-curated images to highlight protester violence'. See Chan and Blundy, 'Fake News Amplifies Fear'.

27. Yiu Chung Wong and Jason K. H. Chan, 'Civil Disobedience Movements in Hong Kong: A Civil Society Perspective', *Asian Education and Development Studies* 6, no. 4 (2017): 327.

28. A further crackdown measure, seen by most as unjust and oppressive, is the invoking of the Emergency Regulations Ordinance by the Chief Executive for the first time in more than 50 years. This allowed the administration to pass a law forbidding the use of face masks and allowing police to interrogate any group of 3 or more persons in the street on suspicion of illegal assembly. See Emma Graham-Harrison, 'Violence Grips Hong Kong as Lam Activates Emergency Powers', *The Guardian Australian Edition*, 5<sup>th</sup> October 2019, theguardian.com.

Citizens saw the mask ban law as unlawful and as an infringement on human rights, and again took to the streets to protest peacefully, with young and old wearing masks to voice their dissent across the city. See Lai and Wu, 'Six Months of Hong Kong Protests'.

After the mask ban law was enacted, numerous video footages on media platforms showed police abusing this new law to interrogate, pepper spray and arrest young students wearing masks whenever they were seen in groups of 3 or more, even when they were not protesting. Thousands were arrested under this law.

In the end, 'The Court of Appeal ruled that it is only constitutional for the government to ban the wearing of masks at illegal assemblies but not otherwise and it is unconstitutional for police to physically remove masks of citizens arbitrarily'. See Jasmine Siu, Alvin Lum and Chris Lau, 'Hong Kong Mask Ban Legal When Aimed at Unauthorised Protests, Court of Appeal Rules in Partially Overturning Lower Court Verdict', *South China Morning Post*, 9<sup>th</sup> April 2020, scmp.com.

29. See Lai and Wu, 'Six Months of Hong Kong Protests'.

The level of violence of the protests reached its peak when riot police stormed and sieged two university campuses, with thousands of cases of tear gas, pepper bombs, rubber bullets and water cannons being used, turning the campuses into war zones as protestors retaliated by slinging bricks, arrows and gasoline bombs.

The clashes resulted in hundreds of protestors being injured and hundreds arrested, especially in the Polytechnic University battle where one police officer was also injured on his leg by an arrow slung by the protestors. Many protestors were captured by riot police and beaten, kicked and dragged. Volunteer medics, who tried to provide medical assistance to students, were seen captured by police with their hands tied behind their backs, sitting on the ground. Numerous citizens and other protestors who rushed to the area near the universities to try to help the students were also arrested by riot police.

The siege of the universities resulted in a strong outcry from the public and from human rights groups who condemned the inhumane actions of the riot police.

30. 'No End in Sight: Torture and Forced Confessions in China', *Amnesty International*, November 2015, amnesty.org.

31. A survey shows that over 90 per cent of people in Hong Kong support the establishment of an independent investigation into the excessive and unwarranted state violence. See Lee et al., 'Hong Kong's Summer of Uprising', 17.

32. On 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2020, the CCP announced that it would amend the Basic Law to impose a National Security Law in Hong Kong, bypassing the Hong Kong Government and its legislative process, claiming that the purpose was to crack down on 'violent and terrorist forces'. This move attracted an outpouring of local and international concern and condemnation over the breach of the Basic Law, the erosion of civil liberties and of the independent judiciary in Hong Kong, the destruction of the city's autonomy and the criminalising of those who participated in the protests in 2019. See Reuters, 'China Says Hong Kong's Security Law Needed Because of "Violent and Terrorist Forces"', *ABC News*, 25<sup>th</sup> May 2020, abc.net.au.

A month later, the National Security Law was passed on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2020, effective from 1<sup>st</sup> July 2020, with Hong Kong Authority officers, members of the legal profession and citizens only able to see its clauses a few hours before it came into effect.

33. 'Hong Kong's National Security Law: 10 Things You Need to Know', *Amnesty International*, 17<sup>th</sup> July 2020, amnesty.org. Since the National Security Law was enacted, major western countries, including the Five Eyes and some Asian countries, have condemned the Law due to its application to Hong Kong citizens living abroad and its deviation from basic human rights. See 'Hong Kong National Security Law', *Wikipedia*, n.d., en.wikipedia.org.

34. (1) By December 2019, police had fired approximately 16,000 rounds of tear gas and 10,000 rubber bullets. See Verna Yu, 'As Protests Continue in Hong Kong, Beijing's Criticism of Churches Grows Louder', *America: The Jesuit Review of Faith and Culture*, 13<sup>th</sup> December 2019, americamagazine.org/politics-society.

(2) There were 13 suicides directly related to distress over inaction or repression by the government, and two deaths, including one university student protestor who was suspected of having fallen from a two-level carpark during nearby clashes. See '2019–20 Hong Kong Protests'.

(3) As of 9<sup>th</sup> December 2019, at least 2,600 people were reportedly injured, many seriously, including one journalist and one teacher hit by police grenade or rubber bullets that resulted in both of them having one eye blinded or nearly blinded. In both cases, no police has yet been identified as responsible. See '2019–20 Hong Kong Protests'.

(4) In separate incidents, two young student protestors, one unarmed and another holding a flimsy white stick, were seriously injured by police live bullets fired at close range, resulting in life-threatening injuries. See '2019–20 Hong Kong Protests'.

(5) An elderly man was hit on the head and killed by a brick thrown by a protestor during a confrontation between a group of protestors and a group of pro-government loyalists, during which both groups were hurling bricks at one other. This resulted in two teenage protestors facing murder and riot charges in April 2020. See AFP, 'Two Hong Kong Teens Charged with Murder after Death of Elderly Man at Protest Clash', *Hong Kong Free Press*, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2020, hongkongfp.com.

35. (1) More than 9,000 mostly young protestors were arrested, with close to 2,000 prosecuted. See '2019–20 Hong Kong Protests'.

(2) In April 2020, Hong Kong police continued their crackdown by arresting and prosecuting 15 democratic party leaders and activists, including the 81-year-old Martin Lee, the 'founding father of democracy of Hong Kong', for their participation in peaceful marches in 2019. In May, some of them were charged for the additional

offense of inciting illegal protests. See Chris Lau and Brian Wong, 'Hong Kong Protests: Opposition Activists Vow to Fight on Despite Threat of Stiffer Sentences after Prosecutors up Charges', *South China Morning Post*, 18<sup>th</sup> May 2020, [scmp.com](http://scmp.com).

36. In late November 2019, democratic parties gained a landslide victory in the Hong Kong local district elections, winning close to 90 per cent of the district seats, the majority of which used to be occupied by pro-Government candidates. There was an unprecedented voter turnout rate of 71 per cent, with 57 per cent of votes going to democratic nominees. See '2019 Hong Kong Local Elections', *Wikipedia*, n.d., [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

37. Jillian Kay Melchior, 'Hong Kong's Spiritual Battle: With Parishioners Split over Politics, Pastors Try to Keep Churches Together', *The Wall Street Journal Online*, 17<sup>th</sup> October 2019, [wsj.com](http://wsj.com).

38. A hymn called 'Sing Hallelujah to the Lord' surprisingly became an unofficial anthem in the early weeks of the protests and appeared to have a pacifying effect on non-Christians. See Josephine Ma, 'Hong Kong's Protest Pastors: As Violence Escalates, Churches Struggle to Find a Place between Religion and Politics', *South China Morning Post*, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2019, [scmp.com](http://scmp.com).

39. 'The Prophetic Voice of Hong Kong's Protesters.'

40. 黎祉穎, 'Joint Statement of Chinese Christian Churches Members - Objection of National Security Law: Hong Kong Needs Justice and Not Threatening to Achieve Prosperity 中華基督教會人聯署聲明反對國安法 香港需公義而非以恫嚇換取歌舞昇平', *Christian Times*, 15<sup>th</sup> June 2020, [christiantimes.org.hk](http://christiantimes.org.hk).

41. Melchior, 'Hong Kong's Spiritual Battle'.

42. Ma, 'Hong Kong's Protest Pastors'.

43. Yancheng Liang 梁燕城博士, 'A Rational Analysis of the Anti-Extradition Bill Protesters 從理性分析反修例遊行理信行者', *Facebook*, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2019, [facebook.com/legislatearticle23/posts/1594953957301160](https://facebook.com/legislatearticle23/posts/1594953957301160).

44. Melchior, 'Hong Kong's Spiritual Battle'.

45. Yu, 'As Protests Continue in Hong Kong, Beijing's Criticism of Churches Grows Louder'.

46. 'The Prophetic Voice of Hong Kong's Protesters.'

47. (1) A relatively larger number of church leaders, bishops and seminary principals voiced their support, through joint statements and on media platforms, for the need to uphold justice and human rights, calling on the government to withdraw the Extradition Bill, resolve the confrontation with protestors and conduct an independent investigation into the excessive use of violence by police, while seeking peace from all parties, especially the police. See 陳盈恩 麥嘉殷 沈月蘭, '多位宗派領袖發聯署籲政府化解政治危機. Many Religious Leaders Issued Joint Declarations to Call for the Government to Resolve the Political Crises', *Christian Times*, 9<sup>th</sup> August 2019, [christiantimes.org.hk](http://christiantimes.org.hk).

(2) On the other hand, Blue Camp church leaders issued a joint statement calling for peace between all parties while stating their objection to protestors using any violence or force that would threaten the life and safety of people, including blocking roads and disrupting traffic. See Editorial Board, '別讓仇恨在心裡植根！教界呼聲籲停止暴力. Do Not Let the Root of Hatred Grow in Your Heart! Religious Sector Called for Ceasing of Violence', *Gospel Herald*, 13<sup>th</sup> August 2019, [chinese.gospelherald.com](http://chinese.gospelherald.com).

48. Lam replied: 'Many people said, "Why don't you condemn the young people also?"', to which one of the Christian leaders answered, 'Let's first set up an independent commission to find out the causes of their actions'. See Ma, 'Hong Kong's Protest Pastors'.
49. Ma, 'Hong Kong's Protest Pastors'.
50. Ma, 'Hong Kong's Protest Pastors'.
51. Melchior, 'Hong Kong's Spiritual Battle'.
52. Jürgen Moltmann, 'Political Theology', *Theology Today* 28, no. 1 (1971): 6-7.
53. Moltmann, 'Political Theology', 7.
54. Moltmann, 'Political Theology', 7.
55. Moltmann, 'Political Theology', 8.
56. Wendy Dackson, 'Book Review: *The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology* by Oliver O'Donovan', *Journal of Church and State* 39, no. 4 (1997): 800.
57. Oliver O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19.
58. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 19.
59. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 12.
60. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 30; Peter J. Leithart, 'Book Review: *The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology* by Oliver O'Donovan', *The Westminster Theological Journal* 63, no. 1 (2001): 209-210.
61. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 20.
62. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 36, 45.
63. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 36-37; Leithart, 'Book Review', 210.
64. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 36.
65. Martin Buber, *Kingship of God* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967), 101, cited in O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 36.
66. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 37.
67. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 38.
68. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 37-40.
69. Stephen Charles Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 71.
70. Nicholas Wolterstorff, "'The Authorities Are God's Servants": Is a Theistic Account of Political Authority Still Viable or Have Humanist Accounts Won the Day? And Responses', in *Theology and Public Philosophy: Four Conversations*, ed. Cecilia Rodriguez Castillo and Kenneth L. Grasso (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 61.
71. Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'A Discussion of Oliver O'Donovan's *The Desire of the Nations*', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 54, no. 1 (2001): 91.
72. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 41-43.
73. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 41.

74. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 41.
75. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 41.
76. Dackson, 'Book Review', 801.
77. This is 'the law of the Spirit of life', discussion of which is relevant to the discussion of the natural law tradition of ethics. However this falls outside the scope of my investigation.
78. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 49.
79. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 80-81.
80. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 82.
81. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 82, 83.
82. The concept of dual authority is shared by Wolterstorff, who points out that earthly rulers are often depicted in the Scripture (Psalm 72) 'as commissioned to mediate God's justice to the people', which is their main role. See Wolterstorff, 'The Authorities Are God's Servants', 61.
83. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 82.
84. Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*, 165.
85. Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*, 165.
86. Stephen Charles Mott, *A Christian Perspective on Political Thought* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993), 61, 63.
87. Mott, *A Christian Perspective on Political Thought*, 65.
88. Richard J. Mouw, *Political Evangelism* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1973), 45, cited in Mott, *A Christian Perspective on Political Thought*, 61.
89. Mott, *A Christian Perspective on Political Thought*, 60.
90. Mott, *A Christian Perspective on Political Thought*, 61.
91. David T. Koyzis, 'Christians Should Submit to the Governing Authorities — Except When They Shouldn't', *Christianity Today* 60: Consider Civil Disobedience, no. 3 (April 2016): 44.
92. Jeanne Heffernan Schindler, 'On the Origin and Nature of Political Authority: A Response to Nicholas Wolterstorff', in *Theology and Public Philosophy: Four Conversations*, ed. Cecilia Rodriguez Castillo and Kenneth L. Grasso (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 76.
93. Schindler, 'On the Origin and Nature of Political Authority', 76.
94. Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*, 133.
95. Augustine claimed that 'an unjust law is no law at all' in his extended dialogue with Evodius in his *On Free Choice of the Will*, 1.5, which was cited by Aquinas who asked: 'Whether human law binds a man [*sic*] in conscience?', in *Summa Theologica* 1-2.96.4. Referenced in Kyle B.T. Lambelet, 'Lovers of God's Law: The Politics of Higher Law and the Ethics of Civil Disobedience', *Political Theology* 19, no. 7 (2018): 605.
96. Koyzis, 'Consider Civil Disobedience', 41.
97. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 73.

98. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 74-76.
99. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 74, 75.
100. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 74, 75.
101. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 75, 76.
102. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 76. Also see Jeremiah 4:19, 6:11, 8:21.
103. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 75. There are many other examples from the Scriptures such as 1 Kings 22:15, 19:3-18 - see O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 76.
104. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 80.
105. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 80.
106. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 80.
107. Robert Duncan Culver, *Civil Government: A Biblical View* (Edmonton, Alberta, Canada: Canadian Institute for Law, Theology and Public Policy, 2000), 18.
108. Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*, 171-172.
109. Wolterstorff, 'A Discussion', 94.
110. Wolterstorff, 'A Discussion', 95.
111. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 91-92.
112. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 91-92.
113. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 91-92.
114. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 100.
115. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 100.
116. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 100.
117. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 233.
118. Leithart, 'Book Review', 210.
119. Leithart, 'Book Review', 210.
120. Leithart, 'Book Review', 210.
121. John H. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 193.
122. O. Palmer Robertson, 'Reflections on New Testament Testimony Concerning Civil Disobedience', *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 33, no. 3 (1990): 345.
123. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 208.
124. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 209.
125. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 205.
126. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 205.
127. 'Understand further, that powers are from God ... because he has appointed them for the legitimate and just government of the world. For though tyrannies and unjust exercise of power, as they are full of disorder, are not an ordained government; yet the right of government is ordained by God for the wellbeing of mankind. As it is

lawful to repel wars and to seek remedies for other evils, hence the Apostle commands us willingly and cheerfully to respect and honour the right and authority of magistrates, as useful to men....' Stringfellow, *Conscience and Obedience*, 40.

128. Stringfellow, *Conscience and Obedience*, 37-38.

129. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 207.

130. Richard N. Longenecker, 'Exhortations Regarding Christians and the State (13:1-7)', in *The Epistle to the Romans*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016), 667.

131. Longenecker, 'Exhortations Regarding Christians', 680.

132. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 196.

133. Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*, 123.

134. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 197.

135. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 197.

136. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 194; Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*, 13.

137. Mott, *Biblical Ethics and Social Change*. 13.

138. Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, 196.

139. Koyzis, '[Consider] Civil Disobedience', 42-43.

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154. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 320-322.
155. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 319.
156. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 319.
157. Jubb, 'Disaggregating Political Authority', 958.
158. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 293.
159. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 11.
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161. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 53.
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163. Wolterstorff, *Justice*, 69.
164. Wolterstorff, *Justice*, 69.
165. Wolterstorff, *Justice*, 69.
166. Mott, *A Christian Perspective on Political Thought*, 79.
167. Wolterstorff, *Justice*, 117.
168. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 336.
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202. Carver Yu, 'Anti-Extradition Bill Protests', 14<sup>th</sup> June 2019, facebook.com/cgst.edu. Yu is the former president of China Graduate School of Theology in Hong Kong.
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206. There are nonviolent theories of the atonement, such as J. Denny Weaver's *The Nonviolent Atonement* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2001). See also Boersma, *Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross*, 40. However the most direct interpretation of Isaiah 52-53 and Romans 1-3 paints a portrait of God that accords with the traditional interpretation of atoning violence on the cross.
207. Boersma, *Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross*, 40.
208. Boersma, *Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross*, 49.
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230. Elaine Storkey, 'The Politics of the Cross', *Fulcrum*, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2018, fulcrum-anglican.org.uk.
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238. O'Donovan, *The Desire of the Nations*, 4-7.
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252. Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace*, 74-75.
253. Arne Johan Vetlesen, *Perception, Empathy, and Judgment: An Inquiry into the Preconditions of Moral Performance* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 252, cited in Volf, *Exclusion and Embrace*, 77.
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255. For example, propaganda usually involves the media of pro-Beijing groups circulating fake news and hate speech. Also, the Police Chief continues to promote the narrative that the authorities have reason to suspect that protestors have resorted to terrorist activities.
- Other instances included undercover police with masks pretending to be protestors who were suspected to have acted as agitators during protests. See Erin Hale, 'Hong Kong Protests: Brutal Undercover Police Tactics Spark Outcry', *The Guardian US Edition*, 12<sup>th</sup> August 2019, theguardian.com.
- Finally, a police officer was arrested on suspicion of instructing a young man to enter a police station with petrol bombs. See Lilian Cheng Tony Cheung, Danny Mok and Christy Leung, 'Hong Kong Policeman Suspected of Perverting Course of Justice over "Arrest of Man with Petrol Bombs"', *South China Morning Post*, 20<sup>th</sup> April 2020, scmp.com.
256. A Christian magazine, *Breakazine*, postponed publication pending legal opinion on the impact of the Law on its ministry. Also, an article written by the president of the Baptist denomination pointing out the inadequacy of the National Security Law was taken out from its monthly newsletter due to concerns by some senior officers of the denomination over the controversy it may cause.

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